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In 1999 the Financial Services Authority recommended that a standard repayment mortgage was 
the “best advice” for Independent Financial Advisors to give to essentially all new mortgage 
customers seeking the best value repayment vehicle. The FSA simply followed the 
recommendation of the 1999 Report of the Endowment Mortgages Working Party of the Faculty 
and Institute of Actuaries. This working party compared the relative returns and risks with 
repayment and endowment mortgages over a standard twenty-five year term. Endowment 
mortgages benefit from compound rates of growth, and so the underlying capital value available 
for repayment increases disproportionately the longer returns are allowed to accumulate. In 
selecting between repayment and endowment mortgages, the true mortgage term of repayment 
therefore becomes the critical determinant of which repayment vehicle is actually the best value. 
Crucially, the FIA assumed that any variation in the length of mortgage would lead to a reduction 
in the standard twenty-five term, thus giving further weight to the preference for repayment 
mortgages as exhibiting better value.  
 
This study challenges the FIA’s Working Party assumption about the typical term of repayment in 
two ways. First, we draw on economists’ recent developments in consumer theory to show that 
the variation in needs-based expenditure among households is large enough to allow for a 
considerable cohort of the house-owning population to select to extend their mortgage term 
beyond twenty-five years. There is therefore no reason in theory why twenty-five years ought to 
be the upper limit for mortgage debt repayment. 
 
We then present the results of a study of a sample of mortgage applicants in the South East of 
England. These individual case study data are extremely rare, and so the results particularly 
valuable; and the principal result is that the “true” mortgage term for the largest single cohort of 
consumers is longer than 25 years. The results indicate that among those applicants trading up 
(around half of all mortgage applicants) the average extension associated with each move is two 
years. When this 27 year period is then taken as the standard repayment term, the results of any 
comparison of the effectiveness of repayment and endowment mortgages changes dramatically in 
favour of equity-backed investment plans. Simulations based on historic data demonstrate that 
endowment plans are 19.2% and ISA plans 21.6% more efficient than straight repayment 
mortgages over the longer period. Furthermore, the risk of an equity-backed investment plan 
under-performing is halved when the typical mortgage term is extended from twenty-five to 
twenty-seven years. 
 
We therefore conclude that while the FSA’s “best advice” is indeed applicable to many 
borrowers, for the majority the reality is that equity-backed methods of mortgage repayment 
represent a significant improvement compared with the currently favoured repayment mortgages. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1999 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) recommended that a standard repayment 
mortgage should be the “best advice” given by Independent Financial Advisors to almost all 
new mortgage applicants. Unsurprisingly the market share of traditional endowment policies 
has collapsed from nearly 50% of all mortgages in 1997 to 13% today (FACT Index, p. 16). 
Whether the advice is correct or not, however, depends on how closely the underlying 
assumptions mirror the typical behaviour of consumers of mortgage repayment products. 
These underlying assumptions therefore need to be highlighted and empirically validated. 
 
The FSA simply followed the recommendation from the 1999 Report of the Endowment 
Mortgages Working Party from the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries (FIA). The FIA’s 
benchmark was that “new endowments could only be good value if there was a ‘reasonable 
likelihood’ on the long term assumptions that the customer would be no worse off than with a 
standard repayment mortgage.”
1 We would certainly not want to argue with that. The FIA 
were, however, interested solely in comparing existing products rather than in examining the 
general case. Their conclusions therefore remain unchallengeable if all consumers simply 
follow the repayment demands of the industry’s standard products. There are, however, 
important theoretical and empirical questions about whether the typical mortgage customer 
actually behaves like this at all. 
 
The FIA report contrasted the relative risks and returns associated with equity-backed 
(endowment and ISA) and straight repayment mortgages. While equity-backed plans typically 
yield higher returns, the working party concluded that, with the risk of under-performance, 
repayment mortgages were the better product for most new mortgage customers. This is 
because, as the report says, repayment mortgages have a zero risk of under-performing. In an 
investment sense, this is undeniably true. After the final year of a standard twenty-five year 
plan, a repayment mortgage has been repaid in full. An endowment mortgage, by contrast, 
carries the risk that it may produce a deficit. In a wider sense of household debt management, 
however, the risks associated with repayment mortgages are not negligible. One particular 
risk is emphasised here, the risk associated with a household extending the term of its 
mortgage. Consumers with repayment mortgages would then benefit from reduced monthly 
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repayment premiums but risk missing out on any capital gain arising from an equivalent 
extension to an endowment mortgage.
2 
 
This possibility never arose in the FIA report. The FIA working party simply compared the 
merits of a standard twenty-five year term repayment with endowment and ISA mortgages for 
“an ordinary, non-financially sophisticated customer”. The time horizons adopted by the FIA 
were not totally restricted by the industry standard, but critically they assumed that any 
variation in the length of mortgage would be for a reduction in its term. This represents a 
curious self-imposed restriction in their terms of analysis. There is certainly no reason in 
economic theory why the twenty-five year period is some sort of sacrosanct upper limit to a 
life cycle of indebtedness.  After all, the typical Briton moves home between four to five 
times during their adult lives, mostly increasing their mortgage, and each time able to alter the 
period of repayment  (FACT Index, p.12).  
 
In any economic analysis of the relative benefits of the different repayment methods, the 
typical period of household debt repayment over the life cycle is therefore the critical 
variable. Alas, relatively little is known about exactly how long the typical household holds 
mortgage debt for, but should the typical mortgage term be not twenty-five years but longer, 
then the relative merits of endowment and repayment mortgages may well alter significantly. 
This paper considers household indebtedness in some detail and then examines the best 
repayment vehicles. The next section considers the fundamental economics behind household 
borrowing strategies. The following section then presents what is to this author’s knowledge 
the first evidence on actual household mortgage repayment strategies, focusing on the critical 
issue of the real rather than inferred periods of repayment. The final two sections then take 
this newly discovered period of repayment and compare the efficiency and the relative risks 
of repayment and endowment mortgages in simulations using historic data. 
 
2. The Economics of Mortgage Repayment 
For economists, mortgages are important because they enable households to acquire assets, 
assets that influence consumption and saving patterns. Indeed, the incorporation of asset-
backed expenditure has recently enabled economists to solve the classic dilemma of ‘excess 
smoothness’ in observed consumption patterns when compared to the more volatile incomes 
                                                         
2 Both types of mortgage would pay additional interest and charges during any additional years of the 
loan of course. We assume here that these additional costs are equal for both types of mortgage. Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
 
© Andrew Godley, 2002 
5
(Deaton, 1987; and Muellbauer, 1999). Consumption patterns are therefore now understood 
more in terms of the volatility of needs-based expenditure over the life cycle rather than 
solely related to income. Parents, for example, may need to spend higher amounts for pre-
school child-care and university fees, correspondingly saving higher amounts at other times.  
 
This suggests that household savings rates are volatile, with household indebtedness taking up 
the gap between essential (but temporary) expenditure and the earlier accumulation of assets. 
Other recent work has shown how recent deregulation in the mortgage market has both lifted 
credit constraints on many households and led correspondingly both to much increased debt 
to income ratios and a much greater sensitivity of household indebtedness to interest rates 
over the last twenty years or so (Bayoumi, 1993; Muellbauer, 1999, p.26).  
 
The overall impact of recent theoretical and empirical work on consumer behaviour has been 
to suggest that among a cohort of relatively indebted households, where expenditure patterns 
may be especially volatile over the life-cycle (for example, families with large mortgages and 
with two or more children), many would prefer to extend their mortgage term and so trade-off 
the lower monthly repayment premiums (either against the capital sum in a repayment policy 
or into an investment fund in an endowment policy) against other more pressing needs.  
 
Indeed, there may be a whole range of other factors prompting mortgage customers to extend 
the term of their mortgages (institutional factors, adjustment costs, information costs, and so 
on). In fact, any scenario where the discounted value of future interest payments is less than 
the immediate savings in monthly premiums might prompt a term extension. Clearly there is 
therefore nothing sacrosanct the standard twenty-five year repayment term, at least in theory. 
And because the actual total length of time a household remains indebted is the critical 
variable for establishing what would be the most effective repayment vehicle for the typical 
mortgage customer, it is essential to establish how large a proportion of all borrowers extend 
their original term beyond twenty-five years, and by how much. 
 
3. Estimating the ‘true’ repayment terms 
In order to study household mortgage repayment strategies, a sample of mortgage applicants 
was selected, one based in the South East of England and covering the period from mid 1998 
to mid 2000. The sample was stratified according to different categories of mortgage 
behaviour. Because we are interested in discovering that group of the population where Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
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repayment terms were extended, we focus on the group likely to be most financially stretched. 
This group of increasingly indebted applicants borrowed more in their new compared with 
their old mortgages, overwhelmingly because they were trading up to more expensive houses.   
 
Table 1 summarises the main results. This shows that among this group the typical applicant 
changed their mortgage after only 5.83 years of their previous mortgage term. Significantly 
for our purposes only 21% retained the same term on their original debt as before. Fully 71% 
extended their original mortgage term, and only 8% actually opted for a reduced repayment 
period. The net effect of these different repayment strategies was to increase the overall 
period of repayment across the sample by 2.0 years from 25.0 to 27.0 years. 
 
Table 1. Trading Up? Changing Mortgages and Rescheduling Mortgage Terms in the 
South East, 1998-2000 
 
Outstanding debt at 
time of new mortgage 
(£000s) 
Length of time 
since previous 
mortgage (years) 
Debt after new 
mortgage 
(£000s) 












Source: Appendix (coefficients of variation). 
 
If this behaviour is reasonably typical of all households wanting to trade up, then we need to 
change our understanding of the “true” term of one very important cohort of mortgagors. 
Given that nearly three-quarters of all mortgage applications are from households trading up, 
the implication here is that perhaps as many as half (that is 71% of 75% = 53%) of all 
mortgage applicants end up extending the term of their loan each time they move house.
3 
Given the high mobility among house owners in the UK, the typical household may therefore 
retain its original mortgage debt for significantly longer than twenty-five years. 
 
Further research is clearly warranted in order to establish both the true lengths of repayment 
terms and for the entire country. It would nevertheless be difficult to overstate the importance 
of this finding. To repeat: the twenty-five year term of repayment is, in the FIA’s analysis, the 
critical threshold between whether a straight repayment mortgage or an endowment mortgage 
is the most efficient repayment vehicle for the typical mortgage customer. But until it 
                                                         
3 The exact size of this cohort cannot be precisely determined with existing data. There is, for example, 
no way of knowing how many term extenders subsequently extend again. Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
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becomes far clearer exactly how long households remain indebted for, the value of their 
eventual conclusion about the best mortgage repayment vehicle must remain in some doubt. 
The analysis below demonstrates just how significant relatively short adjustments to the 
overall repayment period can be by simulating the relative returns for different repayment 
vehicles over now not a twenty-five but a twenty-seven year period.  
 
4. Repayments versus Endowments over twenty-seven years 
The likelihood that the typical applicants will hold their original mortgage for at least twenty-
seven rather than twenty-five years shifts the balance of effectiveness significantly in favour 
of endowment mortgage plans because of the disproportionate impact of compounded rates of 
growth on capital sums. This is best illustrated by estimating the effect of an extension of the 
mortgage term from twenty-five to twenty-seven years on the monthly premiums required for 
both kinds of mortgage.  
 
For the repayment mortgage, the effect of extending the term of the loan is to reduce the 
monthly repayment premium by approximately 7.4% (2 extra years to repay the total capital 
sum divided by the full term of 27 years).
4 For endowment (and ISA) mortgages the impact of 
two additional years of growth on the size of the eventual capital sum can be simulated using 
historic data. The resulting additional capital sum can then be used to estimate a reduction in 
monthly contributions required for the endowment policy in order to generate the original 
capital sum by the end of year twenty-seven. This is then compared with the 7.4% reduction 
in monthly premium derived from similarly extending repayment mortgages.   
 
Using the historic prices of the leading shares on the London stock exchange, we simulated 
the past performance of a simple tracker-fund investing in UK stocks and shares.
5  Beginning 
in 1945, we examined how our typical tracker-fund endowment or ISA mortgage performed 
for each twenty-five year term since until the year 2000. The average impact on the final 
capital sum of extending the term to twenty-seven years, that is of including an additional two 
years of compounded growth, was dramatic: an increase of 40.78% for an ISA-type plan 
(100% investment in the stock market) and 36.30% for an endowment-type plan (with 20% in 
cash) for tracker-fund mortgage plans taken out in any year since 1945. 
                                                         
4 This ignores the effect of front-loading both charges and interest payments, which would alter this 
crude estimate slightly. 
5 These have been calculated from FT Actuaries 100 Share index, assuming all income reinvested 
during the term of each investment. Source Barclays Capital (2000). Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
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This represents a substantial windfall gain for endowment policies compared to the relatively 
small reduction in monthly premium when extending the repayment mortgage. In order to 
compare the magnitude of these windfalls with the gains enjoyed from extending a repayment 
mortgage, these new capital sums (that is whatever the original endowment policy target was 
plus the windfalls) can be translated into an estimated reduction of the required monthly 
premium throughout the term of the endowment and ISA mortgages that would still arrive at 
the originally targeted capital sum at the end of year twenty-seven. These estimated 
reductions in the monthly premiums range from 26.6% for the average endowment plan to 
29.0% for the average ISA plan beginning in any year since 1945.
6  
 
This difference in the reduction of monthly contributions required to generate a given capital 
sum, summarised in Table 2, is a good indicator of the efficiency of each mortgage product 
over this longer period. Endowment plans are 19.2% (26.6% - 7.4%) and ISA plans 21.6% 
(29.0% - 7.4%) more effective than repayment mortgages at producing a desired capital sum 
over a twenty-seven year term. Recalling that many first mortgages may be held for even 
longer than twenty-seven years, the differences in performance highlighted here would 
become even more acute. 
 
Table 2. The Estimated Reduction in Mean Monthly Premiums from Extending 
Mortgage Terms from twenty-five to twenty-seven years 
 
Type  Repayment  Endowment  ISA 
Reduction (%)  7.4  26.6  29.0 
 
 
Despite these obvious attractions of equity-backed plans, financially unsophisticated 
customers may of course find these investment products unattractive because of the risk that a 
maturing endowment or ISA may produce a deficit compared with the predicted outcome. 
While such risk averse behaviour may be understandable, it is important also to assess the 
impact of the “true” mortgage term on the relative risks of under-performance associated with 
equity-backed investment plans. 
 
                                                         
6 ISAs did not exist in 1945. The performance of tax-free 100% equity-based investment plans has been 
simulated here for illustrative purposes.  Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
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5. The impact on relative risk of extending the term of mortgage 
The FSA has recently suggested that the assumed nominal growth rates of endowment and 
ISA plans ought not to be greater than its mid-rate assumptions of 6% (for an endowment) 
and 7% (for an ISA). With inflation assumed by the FSA to be 2.5%, its real mid-growth rates 
are 3.5% and 4.5% for endowments and ISAs respectively. Historic data on the performance 
of the leading shares on the London stock exchange show that the real rate of growth has 
consistently outperformed the FSA’s real mid-growth rate. 
 
The real rate of return from any twenty-five year investment plan in leading British shares 
started since 1945 has fallen below 4.5% (the predicted real mid-growth rate for ISA plans) 
on only four occasions. This represents a 13.3% risk of under-performance (four years out of 
the thirty years since 1970, the year a twenty-five year plan started in 1945 would have 
matured). If the terms of the typical mortgage (and the investment plan) had been extended to 
twenty-seven years, under-performance would have occurred in only two years, a 7.1% risk 
of underperformance (two years out of the twenty-eight years since 1972, the year when a 
twenty-seven year investment begun in 1945 would have matured). The extension of a typical 
mortgage by just two years from twenty-five to twenty-seven years therefore has the effect of 
reducing the probability of an ISA or endowment plan falling below the FSA’s mid-growth 
rate by almost half. Should people keep their first mortgage for even longer than twenty-seven 
years, the actual probability or risk of equity-backed investment plans under-performing is 
then lower still. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This report has presented new findings on the “true” mortgage terms. Because people move 
house, because they have widely varying expenditure patterns and because they change their 
mortgage, the likelihood is that around half of all mortgagors will actually keep their initial 
debt for longer than the standard twenty-five years.  
 
This finding has important implications for the current FSA-endorsed “best advice” to the 
IFA sector, which emphasises the apparent benefits of straight repayment mortgages to the 
typical customer. In particular, FSA-endorsed “best advice” encourages new mortgage 
customers to move away from equity-backed investment plans.  
 Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
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If all mortgage terms ended after twenty-five years or less, this advice would be less 
controversial. The most important result of this research suggests, however, that the typical 
mortgage customer’s first mortgage will last for longer than the standard twenty-five years. 
The FSA-endorsed advice, therefore, jeopardizes the prospects of mortgage holders benefiting 
from the significant capital gains able to be realized in the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh and 
further years of investment performance.  
 
It is worth contrasting this with personal pension provision, where FSA advice emphasizes 
the benefits of a longer term of investment on the lower monthly premiums required for a 
given final sum. The FSA is not guilty of inconsistency, just flawed analysis. In its entirely 
laudable desire to ensure that consumers of financial products get clear information and the 
best deal, the FSA have failed to take fully into account the behaviour of the typical 
mortgagor in the UK. Following the actuaries’ conclusions (based on the standard length of 
mortgage policy rather than consumer behaviour), the FSA ignored any economic analysis of 
household debt repayment strategies.  
 
In their defence, the FSA may point to the benefits to risk averse borrowers of avoiding 
investing in a volatile stock market. Depending on risk preferences, some mortgage customers 
may prefer to forego the potential windfall with an endowment or ISA mortgage over twenty-
seven years. The results here demonstrate, however, that on grounds of risk as well as return, 
once the “true” term of mortgages has been fully taken into account, equity-based investment 
plans are far less risky than the actuaries and FSA have assumed.  
 
Using historic data, the investment risk is still there relative to repayment mortgages, but 
surely only the most risk averse mortgage customers would want to forego a potential capital 
gain of 30-40% because of a 7% risk of underperformance over a twenty-seven year term. 
Given the benefits in investment performance over long periods, equity-based investment 
plans provide a far better financial service to most new mortgage customers than repayment 
mortgages.  
 
In conclusion, the “best advice” given now to first time buyers to opt for repayment 
mortgages is simply misguided. Given the “true” term of mortgage indebtedness, the actual 
“best advice” for most new mortgage customers is to recommend equity-backed repayment 
plans sufficiently flexible and sensitive to changes in household debt management strategies Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-01 
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over the long term. Only for any subsequent extension to an existing mortgage would house 
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Appendix: Trading Up in the South East of England, 1998-2000. 
  Mortgage 1      Mortgage 2     









1  28  91  25  130.5  99  20 
2  65.4  94  25  190  99  20 
3  47  93  25  76.5  99  20 
4  65  96  25  122.5  99  20 
5  63.4  94  25  141.8  99  21 
6  59.3  95  25  89.5  99  25 
7  57.3  91  25  132  98  20 
8  64  90  25  80  2000  10 
9  89.6  94  25  139.8  98  23 
10  80.9  94  25  168  99  20 
11  112  90  25  270  99  20 
12  76.5  95  25  150  98  24 
13  72  94  25  92  2000  20 
14  82  99  25  106  2000  25 
15  114  89  20  142  99  10 
16  41.7  92  25  75  99  25 
17  119  94  25  275  99  25 
18  43  91  25  120  99  17 
19  80  95  25  140  2000  25 
20  55.5  93  25  250  2000  20 
21  63  98  25  117  2000  25 
22  40  86  25  250  2000  15 
23  44  98  25  157.7  2000  23 
24  72  99  25  90  2000  25 
Mean  68.11  5.83    146.05    20.75 
Std Dev  23.66  3.10    60.40    4.33 
Coeff Var  0.35  0.53    0.41    0.21 
 
The micro sample selected here is undeniably small. It is nevertheless representative as far as can be 
established. It is drawn from the South East (around half of all mortgage applicants are in the South 
East, [FACT Index, p.7]) and these applicants trading up listed here represent 75% of the larger sample 
(nationally 74% of existing house owners applying for a mortgage are trading up, [FACT Index, p.12]).  
Because of necessary client confidentiality conventions, access to such individual case data is 
extremely rare. Concerns over the sample size need therefore to be moderated by the realisation that the 
analysis of any data represents a substantial advance on the previous evidentiary base (as far as the 
author is aware this is the first time an analysis based on such data has ever been published).  
 